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CRIMINOLOGY AND COMMON SENSE
JOHN RATHBONE OLIVER,

M. D.*

During the past year, although there has been no sign of any
reviving interest in Tholas De Qfiincey, there has been abundant evidence of new interest in murder. Perhaps, not in "Murder as a Fine
Art." For "the arts," especially the "fine" ones, have never had much
general appeal to that class of human beings, described as the "great
reading public." But, in murder, as a crime, as an emotional experience; in murder as a means of providing amusement for the reader,
and reasonable hope of emolument for publisher and compiler.
In my criminological collection, on the shelf devoted to "recent
additions," there stands a whole array of new "murder books."
'2
"Studies in Murder,"' "Unsolved Murder Mysteries," "Murder and

Its Motives," 3 to name only a few. When it comes to the murderer's
conflict with the law, there are still more. "The Trial of Thomas
Neill Cream," 4 "Famous Judges and Famous Trials," 5 "Dramatic Days
at the Old Bailey," 6 "Famous Poison Trials. ' 7 For the murderer
himself as a personality, as a psychological problem, there is less
interest. The public appears to be more attracted to the lesser villains.
To "Rogues and Scoundrels," 8 or to "Seven Splendid Sinners" (female). 9 No really good book of this type has appeared since Mr.
H. B. Irving's "A Book of Remarkable Criminals." 10
All of these have been written, more or less, for the home consumption of the tired business man or the weary domestic woman.
But there have been other books, unfortunately' only too many of
*Chief Medical Officer to the Supreme Bench of Baltimore.
"'Studies in Murder," by Edmund Lester Pearson, New York, Macmillan,
1924.2
"Unsolved Murder Mysteries," by Charles E. Pearce, London, Stanley
4Paul,3 1924.
4
"Murder and Its Motives," by F. Tennyson Jesse, New York, A. Knopf,
1924.
.+
"The Trial of Thomas Neill Cream," edited by W. Teignmouth Shore;
London, William Hodge, 1924.
"4'- 5"Famous judges and Famous Trials," by Charles Kingston; London, Stanley Paul, 1924.
Days at the Old Bailey," by the same author, 1925.
~6"Dramat'c
--~ 7 "Famous Poison Trials," by Harold Eaton; London, W. Collins. 1924.
8
"Rogues and Scoundrels," by Philip W. Sargeant, London, Hutchinson &
Co., 1925.
"Seven Splendid Sinners," by W. H. R. Trowbridge, New York, Bren.
tano's, 1924.
+--1918.10"A Book of Remarkable Criminals," by H. B. Irving, New York, Doran,
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them, that profess to treat of what they call a science of criminology.
Of these one may read7-or not read-"Criminal Types,"'" "Crime,
Its Cause and Treatment,"' 12 "The Soul of the Criminal,"' 3 "Criminology."' 4 This "science vainly so called," to use the words of St.
Paul, usually consists of statistics giving the number of murders to
each American square mile, or of tables that vividly illustrate the
intimate relations between crimes in violence and the weather. Ascording to some of these curves, nature evidently intends you to wait
until August to beat up your wife.
There is, of course, no true science of criminology any more
than there is a science of adultery, if one excepts Ovid's "Ars Amatoria," or of any of those complicated reactions between society's laws
and the individual who breaks them. This ,does not mean that there
may not be a "scientific criminology"; that is, an objective commonsense method of studying and of dealing with delinquency. I should
better have said, with delinquents. Because the moment that you lose
touch with the human individual and try to evolve laws and hypotheses that apply to erring humanity in general, that moment you lose
touch with reality, and usually with common sense.
If we could think a little more clearly, as our European brothers
have been taught to think by daily experience with the facts of the
situation, we should realize that there is a definite domain in medicine,
generally called "Forensic Medicine" (in German, Gerichtliche Medizin
-M6decine Lgale, in French), which is as distinctively scientific-I
do not like the word, but I have none more descriptive-as any other
branch of medicine, experimental or practical. Here, in our own
country, it has seldom been carefully studied or widely understood.
In Europe, however, in connection with the medical faculty of every
university, you will find courses in Forensic or Legal medicine, which
every medical student is compelled to attend, while attached to every
central Bureau of Police you will discover, if the authorities permit
you to look for it, a laboratory with all the most modern chemical and
photographic apparatus-a "scientific" laboratory to which such important matters as blood-stains, foot-prints, bullet-wounds, and forgeries are constantly referred. The university courses give the theoretical teaching, that is, afterwards, practically applied in the police or
court laboratories, and one or more men, trained thus in Forensic
r

-""Criminal Types,"
2"Crime, Its Cause
+ ' 3 "The Soul of the
1924.
- '4"Criminology," by
+1924.

by V. W. Mastern, Boston, Badger, 1923.
and Treatment," New York, Crowell, 1924.
Criminal," by John C. Goodwin, London, Hutchinson,
Edith H. Sutherland, Ph. D., Philadelphia, Lippencott,
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Medicine, are attached to each laboratory or placed at the head of each
university institute.
To them are submitted all those questions in which there is any
point of contact between medical science and the machinery of thelaw. The photographing and reconstructing of the scene of a crime,
the making and recording of autopsies, the chemical analysis of the
viscera of persons supposed to have been poisoned, the examination
of the mental condition of psychopathic criminals-all these and a
thousand other matters of vital importance belong in the province
of Forensic or Legal Medicine.
But these are all questions that admit of a definite, objective, scientific treatment, that demand a clean-cut scientific answer. In them,
there is no emotional element, no sentimental interest in the criminal
as a personality, except in so far as his mental condition may be a
factor in the case. There are no uplifters, no reformers, no social
missionaries in the laboratories and the lecture rooms of the European
institutes of Legal Medicine.
The most perfect example of such an institute is the "Institute
de M~decine Lgale," in Paris; the very modern-looking building, far
down the Seine, a long way below the place where the old "morgue"
used to be-the "morgue" that every American in Paris used to visit
and that once gave to so many pleasantly-terrified spinsters the additional pleasure of quoting Mr. Robert Browning. This new building
is "the morgue" in fact, but not in name. It contains every appliance
and device known to modern scientists for the study of pathological
conditions that are associated with the "La Mdecine Lgale." You
may take a two years' course there-a stiff course it is, too-and may
receive a diploma that assures you of a position as "medicin legiste"
at some French court or prefecture de police.
In Europe, there is, of course, also a branch of departmental government that concerns itself with prisons and with the care of prisoners. Such boards, or "bureaux," of prison control are staffed with
men of experience, who have grown old in the routine duties of prison
administration. They are, for the most part, intelligent, enlightened
people. And, in England, the whole prison problem has, of late years,
been approached with a broad-minded wisdom that has done more to
modernize English penal institutions, to make them constructively
valuable for the treatment of warped anti-social personalities, than
all the wailing emotionalism and all the sporadic efforts of our
American methods of trying to attain the same ends. Such prison man-
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agement, penology of this type, is, in a sense, scientific; at least, it has
some right to call itself so.
In America we have none of these things, or only a few of them.
And the few that we do have seldom function exactly. But, if we do
little, we write a lot, and we talk still more. Indeed, so much has
been written of late in America about "criminology"-and most of it
is written so badly-that one is almost ashamed to try to write anything about the subject at all. People, I think, are getting deadly tired
of hearing and reading about "delinquents," "juvenile offenders," and
"mental deficients." And I do not blame them. Somehow, in their
subconscious mind-such as it is-they have developed the idea that
anyone calling himself or herself a "criminologist" must be some kind
of an uplifter, some new brand of minor prophet, looking for a new
kind of prophesying job. It is difficult, therefore, to make peopleour people-consider the problems of criminology either seriously,
sanely, or justly. It sometimes seems as if one could never even touch
on these problems without putting one's listener or one's reader into a
state of mind, utterly unlike his normal condition. For he, or she,
instinctively, reacts in one of two ways. And thus far, there seems to
be no middle ground of sane and objective understanding.
One type of mind, when confronted-by a crime or a criminal,
reacts with feelings of outrage and expressions of anger. Such a man
seems to have been touched in some tender spot. He is loud in his
demands for punishment, for reprisals on the evildoer. He wants all
criminals shut up forever in dark dungeons, or else hanged at once.
He demands a penology of retribution and revenge. This is a primitive reaction. Doubtless, prehistoric man, when his property (iron
or bronze, wife or children), was taken from him by a stranger, was
filled with exactly these same emotions. He wanted to get hold of
the other man, make him return his loot, and then either maim or kill
him in order to make himself feel happy and secure again. If he
could not accomplish this alone, he would get his neighbors to help
him; and, if they caught the thief, tied him and dragged him back to
the cave of the outraged property owner, the latter would doubtless
perform a dance of joy, feasting his mind meanwhile on the thought
of what he Was going to make the thief suffer. He, the outraged one,
had the evildoer in his power, and he was going to make him paypay in torment and suffering for the discomfort that he had caused.
It is almost exactly this same emotion that stirs in the minds of
some modern men and women, when they see a fellow-being walking
down the street handcuffed between two policemen, or standing up in
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the dock of the criminal court. They have been told that he has stolen,
or raped, or murdered; and they rejoice, because "he is going to get
what he deserves." At least, they fervently hope that he is. And
their joy is immeasurably increased, if it happens that they themselves have suffered something at the hands of the arrested offender.
There may be, doubtless there is, a long way in the processes of
thought and emotion, between the mild mental elation of such a lawabiding individual and the maniacal fury of a crowd of the same individuals that breaks into a jail and carries off the criminal to riddle
him with bullets or to burn him alive. But in the final analysis, it is
the same mental reaction; the same instinctive mechanism. And at
the basis of it, there is either fear or lust. The thief, whom they see
captured or tried, might have stolen from them: the murderer might
have attempted to take their own precious lives. And therefore.
something terrible and appalling must be done to the offender, because
at least one man is afraid of him, so that other potential evildoers
may take warning and become afraid also-not afraid of offending the
sanctity of just law, but afraid of stealing "my property" or of endangering "my life." In minds of another subdivision of the same
type, the basic, unconscious motive is that delight in the suffering of
others, which is so mysterious, so powerful, and usually so vile. To
such minds, there is an intense fascination in the sight, or even in
the thought of another's distress, torment, or pain. It rises but seldom,
"Deo gratias," to the higher level of blood-lust. But it is there, always
lurking just below the surface of many "law-abiding" minds. And
to have another human being absolutely in one's power-a human
being who has been declared by the law to be without rights to "liberty and the pursuit of happiness," and whose power to retaliate has
been taken away-that is intoxicating.
In countries or states, in which the prisons are run on the old
"eye-for-an-eye" principle and where the dominating idea seems to
ne an attempt to send the malefactor to hell before he can die and possibly, by some mistaken Christian arrangement, slip into heaven-a
certain type of man is almost irresistibly drawn to seek the position of
prison warden or prison guard. Frequently-and this is a fact too
often overlooked-such men are either physically weak or else they are
mental cowards, obsessed in either case by a tormenting sense of
inferiority, for which they seek and find compensation in a calling
that gives them almost unlimited control over the minds and bodies
of their less fortunate fellows. These are the brutal, domineering
prison guards, to whom physical suffering is meat and drink. They
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expand, they grow fat in an atmosphere of cringing obedience. And
those prisoners who cannot or who will not cringe, these they "break."
The merely physical "breaking" may not be beyond repair, but some
prisoners are broken mentally forever. The very tone of voice, in
which such guards address the average prisoner, is an insult. An insult
that the prisoner is almost powerless to resent; and if he does show
resentment, he knows that he is playing directly into the hands of his
tormentor. When one has heard and seen such things, as one often
must hear and see them without comment or criticism, one understands why prisoners, who pass through the hands of such men, leave
prison either broken and useless, or else filled with a bitterness of soul,
a desperate rebellion against authority that is naturally and logically
transferred to society and its laws. Such prisoners are the stuff of
which revolutionists, anarchists, and bomb-throwing nihilists are made.
Any man of spirit would react in the same way.
It is very hard, therefore, to talk common-sense penology or criminology to people who are dominated by half-conscious emotions of
either lust or fear. They are blinded by these instinctive reactions to
any clear, objective understanding of the situation.
But there is another class of minds with which it is almost equally
difficult to deal. These men and women, too, are carried away by
their emotions. But it is emotionalism of a very different type. These
are the people, who, when they see a man handcuffed between two
policemen or standing up for sentence in the criminal court, look
piously up to heaven and say: "There, but for the grace of God, go I."
Why they drag in "the grace of God," I have never been able to understand. What they mean to say is: "That criminal and I are very
much alike." They identify themselves with the delinquent; and,
inasmuch as we are, to ourselves, always the most interesting people
in the world, so the delinquent, the criminal, becomes absorbingly interesting. What he did is forgotten. The murdered man, his destitute
children and wretched .wife, the losses in money or goods that may
entail endless suffering on harmless, innocent people-all these things
seem to disappear. They see only ,a man or a woman, who has had
the courage to outrage the laws of society, and who might, if he had
had a little more luck, have succeeded in evading the consequences.
When such people discuss a crime, you will always notice that they
try to minimize the harm done and seem to lay emphasis on the fact
that the thief or the murderer "almost got away."
It is not so easy to analyze these reactions. Often they spread
out from individuals into the community and become mass or crowd
phenomena.
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When one reads, for instance, the very able description of the
Borden murder at Fall River in 1892, given in one of this year's books
that I have already mentioned,' one finds it hard to follow the ebb
and flow of public opinion. Two harmless old people, a man of over
seventy and his wife of nearly the same age, were brutally hacked to
death, one August morning, in their own home, their skulls battered
in with an ax and their faces so hideously disfigured that the doctor
who first examined the bodies said, "Physician though I am, and accustomed to all kinds of horrible sights, it sickened me to look upon
the dead man's face." (Page 23.) The daughter of the house, who
alone had, it seemed, opportunity and motive to commit the crime and
to whom many suspicious circumstances appeared to point, was finally
arrested. But no sooner was she in jail, than a wave of emotional
sympathy for her seemed to wipe out all memory of those two hacked
and battered old people. The State's Attorney received thousands of
indignant letters, upbraiding him for subjecting an "innocent young
girl" to the indignities of a criminal trial. The ministers and the congregation of the Protestant church, to which this "innocent young
girl" belonged, treated her as a martyr; and, when she was finally
brought to trial, she entered the court room, "leaning on the arm of
the Reverend Buck, her devoted pastor." She was acquitted.
The same thing happens today. Some hard-eyed gunman, with
a criminal record as long as your arm, kills some inoffensive citizen
during an organized hold-up. After the first shock of the murder
has worn off, a certain class of people begin to take an intense emotional interest in a man who would not hesitate to shoot down any one
of them, if he happened to stand in the gunman's way.
What is it that, in the eyes of so many men and women, seems to
lend to the criminal such an absorbing interest? Partially it is, I suppose, the love of anything new: any exciting person or event. When
a famous Baltimore gunman and murderer, who had escaped and been
recaptured, was brought back to the Penitentiary, a far greater crowd
of supposedly busy people awaited his arrival at the railroad station
than would ever have assembled to catch a glimpse of the greatest
scholar, or the most distinguished man of science. For scholars and
scientists are many; and murdering gunmen, who escape the gallows,
are, thank God, comparatively few-still. But there is more in it than
this. Modern psychiatry has taught us that our so-called subconscious minds are filled with all sorts of anti-social emotions and trends,
that seldom rise into consciousness, or if they do, are quickly sup15 "Studies in Murder," by Edmund Lester Pearson, New York, Macmillan,
1924.
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pressed, because we have neither the training, the surroundings, or
the motives that go to the making of a distinguished criminal. We
all (so Prohibition has taught us) have within us the makings of a
little law-breaker. But for the major crimes, for the "big stuff,"
we lack that element which our Anglo-Saxon forebears expressed by
the somewhat inelegant word "guts." So, in the criminal, especially
in the more serious offender, and more especially still before he has
been caught and convicted, we see ourselves, as our partially suppressed anti-social tendencies would have us be. We know, in our
souls, that we could never really do such things ourselves. But-butto talk with such an outlaw-to hear the story of his crime from his
own lips-to watch his fight in court-a fight for his life perhapsthat stirs in some of us an emotion of intense interest, while others
of a different cast of thought turn away with an expression of anger,
of disgust, "Ah, to hell with the dirty crook." But we, in some mysterious way, are attracted. And because we cannot reasonably admit to
ourselves that law-abiding, inoffensive citizens, like ourselves, are attracted to a brutal murderer or to a callous, mean-minded thief, we forget the brutality and the meanness, and are at peace with ourselves.
With men and women, who react to crime and criminals in this
emotional manner, is it very hard also to talk common-sense in connection with what we call criminology.
In a class by themselves are those mental reactions connected
with crimes that center around the uncontrolled sexual appetites of
men and women. It is not a pleasant task to attempt to analyze the
motives that will crowd a stuffy court room for long dreary hours,
when some case of this kind is being tried. Even if the judge elects
to hear the evidence "in camera," most of the disappointed audience
will remain patiently in their seats, hoping that, either from a lawyer
or a friendly bailiff, they may catch some tantalizing echo of what is
going on behind closed doors. Nor is it pleasant to watch, as I have
watched so often, the faces of the men and women, who, during trials
of this type, sit forward on the edges of the hard benches, with itching
ears and in positions of strained attention, in order to get the last word
of the abashed little child, who is trying to tell her story to the judge
and the jury. And the lawyer, who says to the child, "Speak a little
louder, my dear, the gentlemen of the jury can't hear you," becomes
suddenly intensely popular among all the back rows of court room
benches. So I shall merely note the fact and its unpleasantness without attempting to explain.

CRIMINOLOGY AND COMMON SENSE

However great a lover of mankind you may be, however often
you may repeat to yourself the ancient dictum of Terrence, you will
find it hard to maintain this uncritical attitude of mind, if you frequent
the criminal court. And not because of the criminal in the dock either.
It sounds so well, after listening with lecherous ears to a trial full of
"sex interest," to sigh and to say: "Ah, yes, as that great Frenchman
expressed it" (you've forgotten his name if you ever knew it),
"'Tout savoir est tout pardonner.' " But why take such indecent delight
in the "savoir"? And why insist on the "tout"?
It is easy to retort with another outworn tag of Latinity and to
say: "Tu quoque" or "De te fabula."- It is true, I suppose, that
every one of us, myself included, belongs, more or less, to one of the
two types that I have tried to outline. Each of us has a foot-or at least
a toe-in one camp or the other. But surely, there must be some common middle ground on which men and women of education and experience may meet in order to discuss these matters from the standpoint, not
necessarily of scientific accuracy, but at least from that of common
sense. If there be anything worthy of the much abused term "science"
that is available today in dealing with criminals and with prison administration, then why not be "scientific" so far as we can and may? And
it is a proposition of fundamental importance that, in scientific discussions or applications, emotionalism of any type has no place. It is
as preposterous to approach the problems of criminology from an emotional standpoint or with emotional prejudices, as it would be to attempt
to deal with the problems of organic chemistry, or of zoology in such
a frame of mind. Emotion clouds the judgment always.
Sentimentality, the product of shallow emotion, is a cheap product,
showy but not lasting. And in our modern American attitude towards
crime and its results, there has been a great deal too much of it. For
emotion, if allowed to run riot, always results in prejudice. And it is
utterly hopeless to attempt to fight prejudice, once it has been firmly
established. You will often be forced to give up those lines of investigation or achievement, along which you have been proceeding, if you
find that emotional prejudice blocks your way. And you will surrender without words of protest, if you are a wise man. You must
start all over again and try to reach the same goal from another direction. Moreover, emotion is a powerful reactive force. Emotions of
one type call into being entities of an opposite kind. Then, both types
harden into prejudices, bitter, irreconcilable; and your path is blocked.
You find yourself unexpectedly in the midst of a conflict, or you
come up against a blank wall; you can go no further, at least in one par-
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ticular direction and along one well-marked road. Time and time again,
in the domain of penological or criminological interests, I have watched
this process play. itself out. The result almost always is, that long years
of patient work are scrapped, that apparent failure steps in, where there
should have been room for nothing but assured success. And so often
all this has come to pass, because the problems that should have been
dealt with in an objective, unemotional manner have been judged by
states of feeling rather than by orderly processes of thought-by the
instinctive emotions of the moment rather than by the common sense of
tested human knowledge and experience.
This is very discouraging for anyone who believes that the problems of criminology are susceptible of rational treatment.
Of
course, we have to deal with human lives, with personalities, and
not with soulless chemical or biological reactions. There must always
be room left for the interplay of mind on mind. We must keep our
attention, not on the crime, but on the criminal who commits it. And
this is where the difficulty arises. We have not yet learned, it seems,
in criminology at least, how to deal with human personalities without
letting loose human emotions and human prejulices. Perhaps we are
not yet sufficiently civilized. At any rate, I cannot see why, without
losing the so-often vaunted "human touch of common brotherhood,"
we cannot treat the law-breaking "brother" as we treat those who have
made themselves seriously ill by breaking the laws of health. From
such patients, we physicians take away the thing that has caused the
illness, the drink or the drug, or whatever it may be; and then we
bend all our energies toward the accomplishing of two things: first,
we try to repair the damage done to the physical machinery of the
body; and secondly, to give to our patient such a clean-cut sensation
and assurance of restored health and strength that his body will no
longer demand the poisonous thing that he once needed in order to
maintain that assurance and procure that sensation in a dangerous
way. Sometimes, we cannot give him this, or, at any rate, not absolutely; and so we have to supply him with some sort of a crutch to keep
his feet from stumbling. But we don't become emotional about it all.
We don't feel a mysterious sympathy with such a patient-a sympathy
that clouds our judgment of his case. Nor are we deeply enraged
with him for getting into such a condition, and want to punish him
with confinement and physical torment because he has been such a
thoughtless idiot. We do not permit the prejudices that crystallize out
of emotion to hamper us in our treatment. If some colleague, can
offer us a type of treatment that is manifestly better than ours, we

CRIMINOLOGY AND COMMON SENSE

565

accept it gladly; if he can suggest some new medicinal preparation,
we are delighted to use it. We don't make the sick man suffer
because of any personal antipathy we may feel towards alcoholics,
luetics, or drug addicts. While he is under our care, we are thinking
only of one thing: his wellfare; and this end we hope to achieve by
taking away the thing that has hurt him, by repairing the damage
done, by making him well enough and strong enough to need his
particular poison no longer, and to send him out into the world, able
to stand on his own legs and to make his own way.
The parallel between the delinquent and the sick man has, of late
years, been scandalously overworked. One is almost ashamed to use
it again. But if the stress be laid on the likeness between the criminal
and the man temporarily poisoned with alcohol or narcotics, the
description has in it elements of truth that are permanent because they
are true, and helpful because they are supported by experience.
The English criminal law and the methods of its enforcement are
based on age-long experience. In this country, we have an idea that
English criminal procedure is rather merciless, that evildoers, very soon
after their evil deeds, are tapped on the shoulder by a "bobby," and
that there follows, with inevitable precision, a long sentence to some
glum, gloomy prison, where the "convicts" pick oakum (whatever that
may be) or wear themselves to shadows on a treadmill. Some of us,
I fear, have translated the marvellous poetry of "The Ballad of Reading Gaol" into the prose of an almost wholly imaginary prison environ-"
ment.
Two summers ago, I had the great good fortune to be able to
spend two weeks of my summer's holiday at New Scotland Yard and
at the Central Criminal Courts in London. This was the beginning
of a sort of pilgrimage of enlightenment, starting in England at New
Scotland Yard, passing from there to the Prefecture de Police in
Paris, thence to the Polizei-Praesidium at Vienna, and finally back to
England again for a final comparative glimpse of English methods. I
had, I think, unusual opportunities, not because of any achievements of
my own but because I had been fortunate in my friends. A letter from
Sir Basil Thomson put me in touch with Scotland 'Yard; another from
i. Jusserand, the French ambassador, commended me to the Paris
police; and still a third from the Austrian Charg6 d'Affaires in Washington, a very courteous and able young diplomat, seemed to impress
the Viennese police authorities so deeply that, had I not been forced to
depart, I should probably be inspecting parts of their complex organization still. I returned to America, filled with information and ex-
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perience that was to me intensely interesting, but that has been, from
a practical standpoint, almost, if not quite, useless. All that remains
to me now of those crowded, fascinating days is an overdrawn letter
of credit, and the names and addresses of several English, French, and
Austrian colleagues, to whom I send greetings at Christmas time.
American conditions differ "toto caelo" from conditions in Europe.
In our loosely organized federation of "sovereign states," each with
its own criminal code, the compact organization of the European police
bureaux is utterly unacceptable, and perhaps undesirable also. However, in Europe, I learned to appreciate the work of our American
police. For I saw the careful method of selection, by which European
police candidates are chosen; I watched the long course of training to
which they are subjected, in police schools that are like small universities, with the most distinguished legal authorities and criminologists
as professors; and I realized that, in spite of their careful selection and
their long training, these European policemen, so far as the achievement of objective results was concerned, were not much, if at all,
superior to their American colleagues. What an unrivaled detective
force might be created in America, if to the natural abilities of our
American character were added the careful training of European.
methods!
Amidst the somewhat confused memories of my European police
pilgrimage, New Scotland Yard and the Central Criminal Courts of
London stand out as surpassing in interest everything else that I was
lucky enough to see at work, day after day. There is something so
simple, so direct, and at the same time so inevitable about English
ways of dealing with criminals and with crime. If the punishment
imposed does not always "fit the crime," at least it follows hard and
close after it. In a trial at the Criminal Courts, there is little noise,
and very little discussion. Words are few; but they all mean something. During the mornings that I spent in one of these courts, I
heard a juror challenged only once. And only once did I hear counsel
for the defense interpose during the testimony of a witness with a
quiet "My Lord, I object." Moreover, there was an almost painfully
anxious effort to give the accused every possible chance to prove himself innocent. If he had a criminal record, it might not be even mentioned until he had been found guilty "by the jury. Then, before sentence was passed, the record was read. Moreover, there was never any
attempt on the part of the prosecuting officer to secure a conviction.
The case against the accused was stated without any emotional appeal
to the jury, and in the simplest terms. A distinguished barrister, who
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was my guide, philosopher, and friend, during those days at the Criminal Courts, pointed out to me a paragraph in the rules, which the
new Court of Criminal Appeal has laid down for the prosecuting officers of the Crown. This paragraph reads: "Counsel for the prosecution ought not to struggle for a conviction, but should regard themselves as ministers of justice, assisting in its administration, rather
than advocates."
In England, no virtue is attached to securing a
conviction. To press for one is not merely to violate the tradition of
the bar, it is also a violation of the declared principles of the Court of
Criminal Appeal.
Yet for all that, the guilty seldom escape unpunished. There are
few means, if any, of circumventing the law. And, if a man or a
woman, of malice aforethought, takes the life of another, both man
and woman are "hanged by the neck until they be dead. And may
the Lord have mercy on their souls." The dreadful words of such
a sentence are often heard in the courts of England; as often, or
almost as often as there is murder done. During the eight years of
my own service in connection with our criminal courts, I have heard
these words only seven times; never spoken to a woman, and only
twice 'to a white man. Yet, Maryland is not distinguished by any
unusual backwardness of her citizens in the committing of murder.
But for an object lesson in common sense, there is nothing better
than a few morning hours spent in one of the police courts of London.
These Courts of Summary Jurisdiction, as they are more properly
called, are very remarkable institutions. They bear only a very faint
resemblance to our own police courts. Really, they are not "police"
courts at all, as they have no connection with police stations, and the
only policeman that one sees there is the officer who has, in each case,
made the arrest. But, like our own "magistrates courts," they deal with
all the petty unpleasantnesses 'of life, with the skeletons in family cupboards, with the unlovely side of matrimony, with the habitual or
occasional alcoholic, with "street women," with all the flotsam and
jetsam of human life in a large city. In another aspect, they are
unlike our courts, in that their powers are very extensive. The limits
of the sentences, that they may impose are very wide; they may parole,
without restriction, a habitual delinquent as well as a first 6ffender;
they may commit juvenile delinquents to reform schools or to Borstal
institutes; they may issue orders of separation and maintenance to
disgruntled husbands or unhappy wives. Or, if the offense be serious
and indictable, they may hold the accused for trial in the criminal
courts. The magistrates themselves are the most interesting element
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of all, for they are men of the English upper classes-public school
and university men, lawyers who have had a long and varied experience
at the bar and who possess an intimate, detailed knowledge about the
conditions of daily life in that part of the great city over which their
jurisdiction extends.
In a morning, spent at the Bow street or the Marlborough street
court, one might find material for a book, for several books: I was
especially fascinated by the common-sense manner in which "drunks"
were disposed of. In each case, the first question asked by the magistrate was invariably, "Were you drunk?" If the reply was a shamefaced or a brazen "Yes, Your Worship," then a small fine-a few
shillings-was imposed. Sometimes, the man or the woman was
warned that they had been appearing in court at rather too frequent
intervals, and that, next time, the sentence might be more severe. But
usually, the frank admission of drunkenness settled the case. Far
otherwise, however, if the accused retorted, "No, Your Worship, I was
not." Then, and then only, the officer, who made the arrest, was
called to testify, and perhaps some bystander also, who had seen the
disturbance and the condition of the man who had caused it. And, if it
became evident from their testimony that the man was drunk, Heaven
help him. His fine was three times what it would otherwise have
been, and there might be a punishment still more severe, for he had
put the court to the trouble of proving him a liar.
The police, themselves, have another common-sense way of dealing
with "street drunks." When a hopelessly intoxicated man is arresteda man who is dead to the world and who has "passed out," he is
taken to the police station and examined by the police surgeon. If
he is conscious, he is propped up in front of the desk-sergeant, and
here also, he is asked: "Are you drunk?" If he admits the soft impeachment, he is consigned to a fairly* comfortable cell and told "to
sleep it off." If he says "No," the"whole method of procedure changes.
The police surgeon is summoned immediately, for the London police
take no chances; they will run no danger of locking up a sick mannot drunk, but stuporous-and of finding him the next morning, dead
on the floor of his cell. The police surgeon, therefore, examines the
protesting patient. If he is not drunk, as he says, he goes to the
hospital; if he manifestly is, then, into a cell he goes. And the next
day, before the magistrate, the fact is brought out that he said he was
not drunk, when he was demonstrably "full to the neck," and so disturbed the slumbers of the police surgeon, called to examine him. The
poetic justice of the situation lies in the fact that the surgeon is paid
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so much for each case that he examines, and that one-half of his fee
must, as an additional fine, come out of the pockets of the patient, if
it be proven that he had been lying about his condition.
These are chance examples of the common-sense way in which the
English criminal law is enforced. You will find the same commonsense in English prison administration. From the outside, it may often
seem callous, over-systematized, to our emotional American prison
reformers. But it is successful, or fairly so; and it runs smoothly.
Moreover, its general outlines are clean-cut; they do not change every
few months. You do not find one way of dealing with prisoners at
Portland, and an entirely different method at Pentonville. Of course,
there are various types of prisons; but there is uniformity of administration and, therefore, stability. The governor, or the warden, does
not administer his prison according to his own more or less enlightened
ideas about penology; he discharges the duties of his office according
to the rules and regulations that are laid down for him by the Board
of Control at the Home Office in London. I visited many English
prisons, two years ago; I spent many interesting hours with the
physician who is at the head of the prison medical service; and I
found him and his colleagues, medical men and laymen alike, very
humane, very kindly people-a little too hampered perhaps by precedent and regulation, but, on the whole, able, experienced, commonsense administrators of a great public trust, who felt keenly their
responsibility for the welfare of the prison population under their
control.
English courts and English prisons are not the merciless, cold,
unsympathetic agencies that we so often imagine them to be; agencies,
that think only of punishing the crime without thought or understanding for the criminal. From the lofty standpoint of our American
"prison reform," we look down on them as reactionary, as falling far
behind us in the humane development of criminology and penology.
I can suggest no better cure for this patronizing state of mind, than
the reading and the inwardly digesting of a recently published English
book-a book that stands in a class by itself--"The Loom of the
6
Law." G

Occasionally, among all the emotional and prejudiced volumes
that are compiled or written about crime and criminals, a book appears
that comes to me like light in a dark place, like an unexpected solu"~

6
"The Loom of the Law," by J. A. R. Cairns. The experiences and reflections of a Metropolitan magistrate. Third edition. London, Hutchinson &
Co., 1925.
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tion to many puzzling questions that I had almost despaired of ever
solving at all. And here; for a change and for a wonder, is such a
book. Everyone interested in criminal courts, in prisons, in habitual
criminals or in occasional offenders, should read it and then, read it all
over again. It is written by the magistrate of one of the Courts of
Summary Jurisdiction-of a "police court"-a man who has a remarkable facility of expression and the power of writing clear, simple English; a man with traditions and standards of his own and with a very
understanding heart. There is nothing emotional or sentimental about
this book. Its chief characteristic is that rare virtue, which one misses
nowadays in American discussions of similar subjects-the virtue of
common sense. Anyone who thinks that "parole" and "probation"
are newfangled contrivances that only help to produce habitual criminals, ought to read Mr. Cairns' chapter on "The Probation Officer."
"The courts," he says: "are not dominated by sentiment. They are
dominated by sanity. Emotionalism is not mercy. Our work is social
surgery. We deal with the ills of society. And the restoration"
(i. e., by means of probation) "of a healthy, disciplined, orderly citizen
is a greater achievement than burying him and his freedom in the fastness of Portland or Pentonville."
(Page 248.)
The book lends itself to quotation.
too valuable to pass over:

One or two passages are

Mr. Cairns understands the police. "I can imagine," he says (p.
269), "no more dangerous belief than that police evidence" (i. e., in a
trial) "is more credible than the evidence of a reputable citizen."
England has no Prohibition law, but she suffers from something
that is almost as annoying: from rules and regulations laid down "by
departmental chiefs and underlings" (p. 279). Against these "minor
tyrannies," Mr. Cairns appeals to the power of the press. "The descriptions of crimes in the newspapers are not," he writes, "responsible for
increase in delinquency. The contrary is nearer the truth. The press
acts as a warning and a deterrent and demonstrates the fact that the
offender is almost always caught and punished." (P. 271.)
Here is a passage from the chapter on "The Loom and the
Lost," that is worth thinking about:
"It is a curious anomaly that a young girl cannot contract into
legitimate wedlock without permission, but she can contract into illicit
wedlock and into prostitution without interference. A young girl must
not debase her body and mind with dangerous drugs. Cocaine, opium,
morphine and chlorodine are forbidden. The tolerated way to death
ik venereal disease." (P. 148.)
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And here is another, almost equally valuable:
"There is less deliberate conscious wickedness in the world than
the virtuous suppose, and many reputed virtuous have been extraordinarily lucky." (P. 33.)
After all, what is a criminal?
"Criminals are like ourselves, very human. They usually like the
things that we like, and sometimes we do the things that they do, but
some fish get through the net. They generally do a natural thing in
the wrong way or at the wrong time or place, or with the wrong people, and there they are."
But the most valuable element in the book is the writer's attitude
of mind towards the true criminal-the dangerous and the brutal. It
is an attitude of mind that we, in America, too often neglect; our easygoing good-heartedness makes it distasteful to us, and because we
rather shrink from its ultimate conclusions, we make serious mistakes,
mistakes that sometimes impair and nullify an enormous amount of
good work done for other types of offenders who really deserve our
interest and our help.
"The law," Mr. Cairns writes, "is neither dominated by sentiment
nor restrained by fear. It can deal out justice with an unsparing and
heavy hand and make the wrong-doer suffer even unto death." (P.
"The more generous impulses of the law are not intended for,
87.)
nor should they apply to offenses which usually involve qualities of
deliberation and brutality. Such offenses are the expression of a
brutal and depraved nature. . . . A section of the community are
parasites. And not merely do they live on the body politic, they infect
it with dirt, disease and death. They perform no social duty: they
recognize no social bond; they are restrained by no code or sense
of honor." (P. 88.) "By such men, mercy is misunderstood, and on
such, pity is wasted." (P. 68.) "The law is remorseless on the jackals of society." (P. 99.)
It is but seldom that one finds a book like this. I scarcely think
that it could have been written by an American. It faces the issues
so squarely; it is so full of straightforward dealing; yet, at the same
time, it is so human, and above all, so pregnant with common sense.
Surely, then, we, in America, who are faced, day after day, by
the same pressing problems that are involved in our dealing with
offenses and, more important still, with the offenders, surely we might
save ourselves many heart-burnings, many disappointments, if we
could assimilate a little more of the virtue of common sense, especially that brand of it, of which Mr. Cairns is the exponent: common
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sense tempered by human interest and big-heartedness, but in the right
place and at the right time. Much as America may need Institutes of
Legal Medicine in connection with its courts and scientific laboratories
for the study of criminologial data, we could, I think, still get along
fairly well without all these important aids to criminal administration,
if we could only rid ourselves of our inbred emotionalism and our sentimentality in criminological and penological affairs. But we must rid
ourselves also, and above all else, of the old, callous, inhuman law of
retaliation and vengeance, and try to lift ourselves up, or perhaps hold
ourselves down to evenly tempered reactions, to an ideal of justice
that is not always striking indiscriminately to right and left with her
sword, because the bandage has been removed from her eyes forever.
For weak emotionalism is one extreme, and brutal lust for revenge is
another. And the golden mean, that Aristotle once taught as the
measure of true achievement in all things, lies surely and plainly along
the high road of common sense, the only road that does not end either
at a blank wall or in a gutter, but that stretches on straight ahead and
gets somewhere at the last. Or, at least, it seems to get somewhere.
For, like so many other things in this life, its end we do not know and
cannot see. But of one thing we may rest assured: If we keep to it,
we shall neither muddy our feet in the gutter, nor wander off into
barren, pathless fields.

